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Article
Regulation of Adult Businesses Through
Zoning After Renton
RONALD M. STEIN*
This article analyzes the recent Supreme Court decision in Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.' The purpose of the article is to show the
significance of Renton and to give attorneys direction on how to
regulate "adult businesses" effectively through locational zoning
ordinances.
In Renton, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a city may
use a "locational zoning ordinance" to regulate adult businesses. A
locational zoning ordinance is one in which the particular use (adult
bookstores, adult theaters, and so on) is limited to various locations
within a community. For example, one city or county might choose
to prohibit adult businesses within a three hundred foot radius from
another adult business, or from another use, such as a church or
residential neighborhood. Another city might choose to concentrate
all adult businesses within a particular zone or area. The Renton
* B.S., 1968, Duquesne University; J.D., 1972, School of Law, Duquesne University,
Cum Laude. Member, California State Bar; Member, Pennsylvania State Bar. City Attorney,
Lodi, California.
I. 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
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court stated that the ordinance must, however, be a proper "content
neutral" time, place, and manner regulation that a city can justify
without reference to the content of the regulated speech. The city's
interest in regulation of the adult businesses must be unrelated to
the suppression of free expression, but can be related to the secondary
effects of the adult businesses on surrounding neighborhoods. The
Supreme Court found that attempting to "preserve the quality of
urban life" serves this substantial governmental interest. Further, the
Court found that a city may rely upon the experience of nearby
cities in determining what these secondary effects are.
SIGNIFICANCE OF RENTON V. PLA YTIME THEA TRES, INC.
The significance of the Supreme Court's decision in Renton is that
future adult business location ordinances will be analyzed as a form
of "time, place, and manner" regulation. No longer will adult
business location ordinances be analyzed under the "strict scrutiny"
standard set forth in Schad v. City of Mt. Ephraim2 and United
States v. O'Brien3 which established a presumption of constitutional
invalidity that the city must overcome. Instead, adult business loca-
tion ordinances will be analyzed by the "rational basis" standard,
which raises a presumption of validity as set forth in Heffron v.
International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Inc. ,4 Lee Optical v.
Williamson,- and Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc.6 The Supreme Court in Renton swayed from its
earlier reliance on the four-prong test of United States v. O'Brien7
2. 452 U.S. 61, 77 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
3. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Once the Court determines that the ordinance was in fact
content-neutral, then the presumption of statutory validity would again have signifcant force.
See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.35 (1976), discussing the
distinction between the Detroit ordinance of Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. and the
ordinance in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). The Court in Young
observed: "The Court's opinion in Erznoznik presaged our holding today noting that the
presumption of statutory validity 'has less force when a classification turns on the subject
matter of expression.' " Young, 427 U.S. at 71-72 n.35.
4. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
5. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
6. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
7. Under that test the governmental regulation is sufficiently justified, despite its inci-
dental impact upon a First Amendment interest, (1) if it is within the constitutional
power of the government; (2) if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; (3) if the governmental interest is unrelated to a suppression of free
expression; and (4) if the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedom is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of an interest. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
377 (1968).
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to judge regulations that affect first amendment activity. In place of
this test, the court adopted a time, place, and manner analysis, a
test that the court set forth in Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence and Heffron v. International Society of Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc.. 9
This article will discuss the problem which has faced various courts
over the past ten years in the regulation of adult businesses. The
article will also discuss the seminal case Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc.,10 the significance of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc. 11 as it relates to the Young case, cases subsequent to Young,
and intervening cases from Young to Renton, and the different
analyses that have been used by the courts to review locational zoning
ordinances. Finally, this article will discuss the Supreme Court's
analysis in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., and the implications
of Renton as it relates to the regulation of adult businesses.
'THE PROBLEM
Judge H. Lee Sarokin, United States District Judge for the District
of New Jersey, defined the problem in particularly sharp terms in
E-Bru, Inc. v. Graves2 when he observed:
Voltaire did not write: "I disapprove of what you say, but will
defend to the death your right to say it, unless the subject is sex."
Nor did the framers of the United States Constitution. So-called
adult book stores are established to sell merchandise intended to
arouse sexual passions. They also seem to arouse passions of an
entirely different sort. If a merchant announced his intention to
open a store dedicated to murder mysteries, no matter how violent
or bloody, nary a picket or protester would appear. But should one
announce that sex is to be the main theme, then organized opposition
is inevitable ... 13
8. 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984).
9. 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1980).
10. 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
I1. 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
12. 566 F. Supp. 1476 (D.N.J. 1983).
13. The quote ends with the following verbage:
The public permits books, movies and television to inundate us with murder by gun
or knife, strangling, rape, beatings and mayhem, all of which are illegal. But the
depiction of sexual acts, most of which are legal, are condemned with a furor. We
will tolerate without a murmur a movie showing the most brutal murder, but display
a couple in the act of love and the outcry is deafening. This is not meant to be a
defense of sleazy movies in adult bookstores which pander to the bizarre and to the
deviant, but is a plea for perspective in deciding whether such material genuinely
warrants an intrusion into the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.
Id. at 1477-78.
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Normally, when confronted with the opening of an adult book
store, a city council will converge on the city attorney's office and
ask: "What can be done to get that smut out of town?" After the
1976 Supreme Court decision in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., ' 4 many municipal attorneys would have suggested a locational
zoning ordinance to solve the problem. That type of ordinance
prohibits placement of adult businesses at various locations of a city.
However, a city attorney could not guarantee that a court would
uphold the city's locational zoning ordinance. Between 1976, when
Young came down, and the 1986 Renton decision, the federal courts,
except in one instance, 5 have overturned locational zoning ordinances
aimed at regulating adult businesses.)
6
Why were the courts so reluctant to sustain these ordinances? First,
it is important to understand that when a city decides to regulate the
location of an adult business through zoning, the city must balance
two conflicting but important interests:
(1) The first amendment of the Constitution of the United States;
and
(2) The city's need to legislate for legitimate governmental in-
terests.
Justice Powell reminded us of these conflicting interests in Young
v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.'7 when he opined:
This is the first case in this Court in which the interests in free
expression protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments have
been implicated by a municipality's commercial zoning ordinances
.. The unique situation presented by the ordinance calls, as cases
in this area so often do, for a careful inquiry into competing
concerns of State and the interests protected by the guarantee of
free expression.' 8
14. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
15. Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1980) (affirmed part of zoning
ordinance requiring adult business to be separated from each other by 500 feet).
16. Ebel v. City of Corona, 698 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1983); Kuznich v. County of Santa
Clara, 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1982); Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203 (5th
Cir. 1982); Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 667 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1981); Keego Harbor
v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981); Fantasy Book Shop, Inc. v. City of
Boston, 652 F.2d 1115 (1st Cir. 1981); Entertainment Concepts, Inc. v. Maciejawski, 631 F.2d
497 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981); Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 531
F. Supp. 1162 (D. Minn. 1982), aff'd, 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1983); Purple Onion, Inc. v.
Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1981); E & B Enterprises v. City of University Park,
449 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
17. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
18. Young, 427 U.S. at 76.
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The interests protected by the first amendment 9 must be balanced
with the need of cities to protect legitimate government interests by
legislation which avoids the "secondary effects" of adult businesses.
Increased crime, lowering of property values, and harmful effects on
children20 are all legitimate and significant interests which cities are
permitted to address by the use of their zoning power. As the Supreme
Court has noted, the exercise of reserve police powers by a city "is
not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It
is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the
blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air makes the area a sanctuary
for people."' 2' As early as 1926, the Supreme Court in Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 22 sustained municipalities' zoning ability "to
meet effectively the increasing encroachment of urbanization upon
the quality of life of their citizens."
Over the past ten years, cities and counties have struggled with
the conflict between the first amendment and governmental interests.
Any discussion of this ten-year conflict must begin with a discussion
of the seminal case dealing with locational zoning ordinances: Young
v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.
23
THE YOUNG DECISION
The respondent in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.24 op-
erated two adult picture theaters. American Mini Theatres brought
an action for injunctive and declaratory relief, challenging the con-
stitutionality of a 1972 Detroit zoning ordinance and an amended
anti-skid row ordinance25 adopted ten years earlier. The 1972 ordi-
nance provided that unless an adult theater receives a special waiver,
it may not be located within one-thousand feet of any other "regu-
lated use" or within five-hundred feet of a residential area. The five-
19. The first amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall
make no laws respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of people peacefully to
assemble, and to petition the government for redress of grievances." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
20. See generally Young, 427 U.S. at 73.
21. Village of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1973). This language was also cited
by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Young, 427 U.S. at 74.
22. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
23. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
24. Id.
25. Young, 427 U.S. at 52. The ordinance in question dispersed adult theaters rather than
concentrating the theaters in limited areas. Specifically, an adult theater was not allowed to
be located within 1,000 feet of any two other "regulated uses" or within 500 feet of a
residential area.
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hundred foot restriction was declared invalid by the district court. 26
In delivering the plurality decision of the Supreme Court, Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Burger, White, and Rehnquist, looked
first at the original 1962 ordinance and the findings which the Detroit
Common Council made regarding the anti-skid row or "deconcen-
tration ordinance." Under the deconcentration ordinance, the adult
businesses were required to be spaced certain distances from each
other and from other uses. For example, no adult use would be
permitted within three-hundred feet of another adult use, or within
three-hundred to five-hundred feet of an area zoned as residential,
or within three-hundred feet of a church or school. The Council had
found that some uses of property are especially injurious to a
neighborhood when they are concentrated in a limited area. The trial
record contained evidence from urban planners and real estate experts
that the location of several adult businesses in the same neighborhood
tends to attract an undesirable quantity of transients, to affect
property values adversely, to cause an increase in crime, especially
prostitution, and to encourage residents and businesses to move
elsewhere. 2
7
Addressing the argument that deconcentration ordinances act as a
prior restraint on free speech, the plurality decision concluded that:
The ordinances are not challenged on the ground that they impose
a limit on the total number of adult theaters which may operate in
the City of Detroit. There was no claim that the distributors or
exhibitors of adult films are denied access to the market or con-
versely that the viewing public is unable to satisfy its appetite for
26. In Nortown Theater, Inc. v. Gibb, 373 F. Supp. at 363, 369-70 (1974), the companion
case to Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), the federal district court,
while upholding the 1,000 foot rule dealing with the distance between two adult theaters under
the Detroit ordinance, was unable to sustain the section of the ordinance which prohibited an
adult theater within 500 feet of any single dwelling or rooming unit. The Court held:
[N]o arguments are advanced by defendant as to how the prohibition of the regulated
uses within 500 feet of a single dwelling or rooming unit furthered the legitimate
interest the city has in preserving a residential area or neighborhood. Indeed, where
only a single dwelling or rooming unit is involved, we fail to see how the prohibition
of the ordinance affords any protection whatsoever to the neighborhood or residential
areas ... No area of the city is specifically set aside or designated for the regulated
uses. There are few if any locations other than industrial areas in the downtown
commercial area of Detroit where there is not a single dwelling or living unit within
500 feet. Thus the effect of the restriction is almost total ban on uses conceded by
the defendants to be lawful ... We conclude the 500 foot restriction is not necessary
to promote any expressed compelling state interest and is therefore invalid under the
equal protection clause.
Nortown Theater, Inc., 373 F. Supp. at 369-70.
27. Young, 427 U.S. at 55.
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sexually explicit fare. Viewed as an entity, the market for this
commodity is essentially unrestrained. 28
The Court then pointed out that the city's general zoning law
requires all motion picture theaters to satisfy certain locational cri-
teria. Because the zoning ordinance applied even-handedly to all types
of theaters, the Court reasoned:
[W]e have no doubt that the municipality can control the location
of theaters as well as the location of other commercial establish-
ments, either by confining them to a certain specialized commercial
zone or requiring that they be dispersed throughout the city. The
mere fact that the commercial exploitation of material protected by
the First Amendment is subject to zoning and other licensing
requirements is not sufficient reason for invalidating these ordi-
nances.
29
[T~he 1000 foot restriction does not in itself create an impermissible
restraint on protected communication. The city's interest in planning
and regulating the use of property for commercial purpose is clearly
adequate to support that kind of restriction applicable to all theaters
within the city limits. In short, apart from the fact that the ordinance
treats adult theaters differently from other theaters and the content
of material shown in the respective theaters, the regulation of the
place where such film may be exhibited does not offend the First
Amendment.
30
The Court then considered whether the classification was consistent
with the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 3'
The theater owners argued that the regulation violated the equal
protection clause because it treated them differently than other movie
theaters, and that this different treatment was based on the content
of the film. The court responded: "Even though the First Amendment
protects communications in this area (sexually explicit activities) from
total suppression, we hold the state may legitimately use the content
of these materials as a basis for placing them in a different classi-
fication from other motion pictures."
'3 2
Having determined that a city may draw zoning lines based on the
content of theater offerings, the Court was confronted with the
question of whether the lines drawn by the ordinances justified the
city's interest in preserving the character of the neighborhood. Ex-
28. Id. at 62.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 62-63.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 70, 71.
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amining the district court's record, the Court held that the evidence
disclosed a "factual basis" for the common council's conclusion that
the locational restriction would have a desired effect. Accordingly
the Court, finding that the ordinance did not violate the equal
protection clause, opined:
It is not our function to appraise the wisdom of [the city's] decision
to require adult theaters to be separated rather than concentrated
in the same areas....
Since what is ultimately at stake is nothing more than a limitation
on the place where adult films may be exhibited, even though the
determination of whether a particular film fits the characterizations
turns on the nature of its content, we conclude the city's interest
in the present and future character of its neighborhood adequately
supports its classification of motion pictures.3
In upholding the ordinance, the Supreme Court was careful to
note that the situation would be different if the ordinance had the
effect of "suppressing or greatly restricting access to"3 4 lawful speech.
An important test by which later ordinances' constitutionality were
judged is set forth in a footnote:
[The District Court specifically found that "[tihe Ordinances do
not affect the operation of existing establishments but only the
location of new ones. There are myriad locations in the City of
Detroit which must be over 1000 feet from existing regulated estab-
lishments. This burden on First Amendment rights is slight." -5
This test would require later courts to determine from the record
whether there were other locations in which adult businesses could
open.
Justice Powell's concurring opinion emphasized that the case pre-
sented an example of "innovative land use regulations" implicating
first amendment concerns only incidentally and to a limited extent .6
Justice Powell found it significant that over half a century before,
the Court in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.37 had "broadly sustained
the power of local municipalities to utilize the then relatively novel
concept of land use regulation in order to meet effectively the
increased encroachment of urbanization upon the quality of life of
their citizens." Like the majority, Justice Powell dealt directly with
33. Id. at 71-72.
34. Id. at 71 n.35.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 73.
37. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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the relationship between zoning and first amendment rights. He
agreed that opportunity for expression and access to that expression
is the critical issue:
The primary concern of the free speech guarantee is that there be
full opportunity for expression and all of its varied forms convey
a desired method. Vital to this concern is the corollary that there
be a full opportunity for everyone to receive the message ... [T]he
central First Amendment concern remains the need to maintain free
access of the public to the expression.
38
Applying this principle to Detroit's anti-skid row ordinance, Justice
Powell felt that the ordinance did not suppress the production of,
or access to, adult movies to any significant degree. Justice Powell
reasoned:
Nortown concededly will not be able to exhibit adult movies at its
present location, and the ordinance limits the potential location of
the proposed Pussycat. The constraints of the ordinance with respect
to location may indeed create economic loss for some who are
engaged in this business. But in this respect they are affected no
differently from any other commercial enterprise that suffers eco-
nomic detriment as a result of land-use regulation . . . The inquiry
for First Amendment purposes is not concerned with economic
impact; rather it looks only to the effect of this ordinance upon
freedom of expression. This prompts essentially two inquiries:
(1) Does the ordinance impose any content limitation on the
creator of adult movies or the ability to make them available to
whom they desire; and
(2) Does it restrict in any significant way the viewing of movies
by those who desire to see them? On the record in this case these
inquiries must be answered in the negative. At most, the impact
the ordinance has on these interests is incidental and minimal. a9
With this background in mind, Justice Powell applied the four-
part test originally set forth in United States v. O'Brien.40 He sum-
marized that test as follows:
Under that test, the governmental regulation is sufficiently justified,
it must be within the constitutional power of the government; further
a substantial governmental interest-unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and its incidental restriction on First Amendment
rights must be no greater than essential to further the interest. 4'
38. Young, 427 U.S. at 76-78.
39. Id. at 77-78.
40. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
41. Young, 427 U.S. at 79.
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Applying this standard, Justice Powell found that the Detroit
ordinance easily passed constitutional muster:
(1) The ordinance was within the power of the Detroit common
council to enact;
(2) The interest furthered by the ordinances are important and
substantial. Without stable neighborhoods with residential and com-
mercial large sections, a modern city quickly can deteriorate into
an urban jungle with tragic consequences to social, environmental,
and economic values;
(3) Since Detroit had the ordinance in effect for ten years, there
are no facts to sustain an argument that Detroit embarked upon an
effective suppression of free expression; and
(4) That the evidence presented indicated that the urban dete-
rioration was threatened not by the concentration of all movie
theaters within other regulated uses, but only by concentration of
those that elected to specialize in adult movies.
42
INTERVENING CASES
To understand the significance of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., it will be helpful to review some of the intervening cases which
use the "O'Brien Analysis" and "Time, Place, and Manner" anal-
ysis.
A. Cases Using the O'Brien Analysis
During the period between Young and Renton, most of the federal
cases addressing the validity of locational zoning ordinances consid-
ered ordinances that were analytically indistinguishable from the
ordinance upheld in Young. However, the courts consistently inval-
idated these zoning enactments, using the O'Brien four-prong anal-
ysis. 43 For example, in Basiardanes v. City of Galveston," the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated an ordinance which eliminated
an adult theater located across from a new opera house, and further
relegated all adult businesses to heavy industrial zones. The court
determined from the trial record that the city had not shown sub-
stantial governmental interest in preventing "blighting" of a neigh-
borhood by the adult theater in existence. Applying the second prong
42. Id. at 80-82.
43. Kuznich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1982); Basiardanes v.
City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982); Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 667
F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1981). See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
44. 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982).
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of O'Brien-whether the ordinance furthered an important goven-
mental interest-the court held that the ordinance was under-inclusive
because it did not take into account other blighting influences, such
as bars or pool halls. The court questioned how the city could claim
a substantial governmental interest in the elimination of blight when
the city only regulated the adult theaters, and did not regulate other
aforementioned blighting influences present in the neighborhood. The
court looked at the effect of the ordinance on all the present
businesses in the area, and declared that the city had the burden to
prove on the record that its stated substantial governmental interest
in removing and preventing blight would actually be effective when
the only blight-producing businesses the ordinance regulated were
adult theaters.45 Addressing the ordinance's regulation of adult busi-
nesses to industrial zones, the court felt that the city had failed to
meet the fourth prong of the O'Brien analysis-that the restriction
be no greater than is essential to further the governmental interest.
The court held that the record contained no evidence that the
ordinance did not restrict first amendment rights to a greater degree
than was necessary.
In Purple Onion v. Jackson46 the District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia discussed the difficulty that lower courts faced
in interpreting Young. The court explained:
No single equal protection analysis is garnered in the majority of
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., although five Justices
agreed that the Detroit ordinance did not violate the equal protection
clause. While the four justice plurality did not indicate how much
protection sexually explicit expression should be given, it did con-
clude that, in the absence of repression or significant restriction of
public access to this expression, the city's interest in preserving the
quality of its urban life adequately supported the classifications in
the ordinance. Thus, there was no violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On the other hand, Justice
Powell after determining that the ordinance did not suppress the
production of, or significantly restrict public access to, adult movies,
applied the four part equal protection test of United States v.
O'Brien. Perhaps because of the lack of a clearly articulated stand-
ard in Stevens' plurality decision, Justice Powell's analysis has been
most widely followed by federal courts in the wake of Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc.."7
45. Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203, 1215, 1216 (1982).
46. 511 F. Supp. 1207 (D.C. Ga. 1981).
47. Purple Onion v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1206, 1226 (D.C. Ga. 1981) (citations omitted).
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The ordinance in Purple Onion did not contain a clause, known as
a grandfather clause, which would permit businesses in existence at
the time the ordinance was put into effect to remain in existence.
When the court reviewed the evidence relating to sites available to
adult businesses, the court found that over 200 adult businesses
would have to find space in approximately 81 sites. The court applied
the O'Brien analysis to this factual situation and found that although
the ordinance satisfied the first three prongs of the test, it did not
meet the fourth prong. The lack of available alternative sites for
adult businesses showed a greater restriction on first amendment
rights than was necessary to further the stated governmental interest."
In Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson 9 the challenged ordinance
prohibited the showing of "sexually explicit" material within one-
hundred yards of specified areas. At the time the ordinance was
adopted, there was one theater within the City of North Little Rock.
However, no evidence in the record suggested that a neighborhood
would decline because of the presence of this single adult theater
within one hundred yards of that area. The court of appeal agreed
with the City's argument that it may rely on the findings and
experience of another legislative body. Nonetheless, the court held
that some empirical basis should exist to support a finding that the
presence of a single theater in existence within one hundred yards of
a specified area will have a deleterious effect.50 The court also stressed
that the ordinance contained no grandfather clause and would have
required relocation of the one theater in town at the time of the
adoption of the ordinance.
As did the court in Purple Onion v. Jackson, the court in Avalon
Cinema Corp. discussed the two analyses in Young. Interestingly,
the court concluded that the ordinance would have to pass muster
on both tests:
There was no opinion of the Supreme Court covering all of the
issues in Young. That is, although there were five votes to uphold
the Detroit ordinance, the five Justices in the majority could not
agree on a common rationale. Thus, if Young is used as authority
to sustain the North Little Rock ordinance, the ordinance must
satisfy not only the criteria of the plurality opinion in Young [Time,
Place, and Manner], but also those of Mr. Justice Powell's con-
currence. [The O'Brien Test]."
48. Id. at 1227.
49. 667 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1981).
50. Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 667 F.2d 659, 661 (8th Cir. 1981).
51. Id. at 662.
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The court concluded that the ordinance failed the third prong of
the O'Brien test, which requires that the governmental interest be
unrelated to suppression of free expression. Evidence in the record
at the legislative hearing showed that the city council enacted the
ordinance only after being informed of the impending opening of
the theater. Thus, the ordinance violated O'Brien because it was
intended to suppress first amendment speech.
Two years later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals faced a similar
issue in Ebel v. City of Corona.5 2 The court, using the third prong
of the O'Brien analysis, sustained a preliminary injunction against
the City's ordinance. As in Avalon Cinema Corp., the court found
evidence that the city had enacted an emergency ordinance at the
time that an adult theater opened, and that the intent of the ordinance
was to affect that one particular theater.13 Although the city pointed
to contrary evidence that the purpose of the ordinance was to
eliminate blight, the court found the evidence tainted, and held that
the "real purpose" of the ordinance was to suppress content.5 4 Ebel
thus demonstrated that when applying the third prong of the O'Brien
test, a court would look to the record to determine if the "real
purpose" of a regulation was a suppression of first amendment
rights.
The court in Tovar v. Billmeyer" went even further than the Ebel
court in applying the third prong of the O'Brien analysis. The Tovar
court held that if the record contained any evidence that a "moti-
vating factor" in the regulation of the business was the suppression
of content of the theaters, the ordinance could not be sustained.
6
The analysis in Tovar and Ebel is significant in that, when applying
the O'Brien four prong analysis, the court will place the burden of
proof on the city to show that the ordinance was not "motivated"
by an intent to suppress expression. Stated another way, once the
adult business owner puts evidence in the record of some "motivating
factor" to suppress, the city bears the burden of proving that the
ordinance does not, in fact, fail to meet the third prong of O'Brien.
This burden left the cities in the untenable position of having to
"purify the testimony" before the legislative body for fear that if
someone made a comment about the content of the film, a reviewing
court would view that comment as evidence that the legislative body
52. 698 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1983).
53. Ebel v. City of Corona, 698 F.2d 390, 393 (9th Cir. 1983).
54. Id. at 393.
55. 721 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1983).
56. Id. at 1266.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 18
was "motivated" with an intent to suppress. The quandary for the
cities was how to protect citizens' first amendment right to appear
and testify at a hearing, while also avoiding this evidence of "mo-
tivating factor."
B. Cases Using Time, Place, and Manner Analysis
To show the significant difference between the time, place, and
manner analysis of an ordinance as compared to the O'Brien analysis,
one can look at a number of pre-Renton decisions in which the court
used the time, place, and manner analysis. However, in reviewing
these decisions, the reader should keep in mind that even under the
time, place, and manner analysis, a court will still scrutinize the
legislative hearing for two purposes: (1) to determine if adequate
findings support the legislative decision to regulate, and (2) to ascer-
tain whether adequate evidence supports these findings.
In other words, under either test espoused in Young, a court
reviewing an ordinance regulating first amendment activities will still
require certain findings . 7 This requirement is contrary to the normal
review by a court of a legislative decision, in which no findings are
necessary. However, unlike the O'Brien analysis, a court utilizing
time, place, and manner analysis normally will not second guess the
findings or the remedy of the legislative body as to the substantial
governmental interest, and the remedy chosen by the legislative body
to effectuate that substantial governmental interest. There was a
presumption of validity to the ordinance. For example, in Clark v.
Community for Creative Non- Violence58 the Supreme Court upheld
the validity of written restrictions on the use of a national park as
a campground. Writing for the majority, Justice White found that
the regulations were justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, were narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernmental interest in preserving the aesthetics of the national park,
and left open ample channels for communication.5 9 Once the court
accepted as valid the National Park Service's evidence that the
purpose of the ordinance was to protect the aesthetics of the national
parks, the court would not invalidate it because of its effect on the
particular first amendment activities. The Clark case involved a sleep-
in demonstration alleged to be symbolic speech. The Court did not
57. Young, 427 U.S. at 76, 77.
58. 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984).
59. Clark, 104 S. Ct. at 3069.
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concern itself with the effect of the regulation on the particular
demonstration at hand, as the O'Brien analysis would have required.
Instead, the regulation was not judged "as applied":
Surely the regulation is not unconstitutional on its face. None of
its provisions appears unrelated to the ends that it was designed to
serve. Nor is it any less valid when applied to prevent camping in
Memorial-core parks by those who wish to demonstrate and deliver
a message to the public and the central government °
The Clark decision was a precursor to Renton. Once the Court
determined that the governmental enactment was a reasonable time,
place, and manner regulation, serving a substantial governmental
interest unrelated to first amendment activities, the court declined to
apply the O'Brien analysis to determine the effect of the ordinance
on the particular first amendment activities. The court explicitly
declared this choice:
Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions are valid even
though they directly limit oral or written expression. It would be
odd to insist on a higher standard for limitations aimed at regulable
conduct and having only an incidental impact on speech. Thus, if
the time, place, and manner restriction on expressive sleeping ...
sufficiently and narrowly serves a substantial enough governmental
interest to escape First Amendment condemnation, it is untenable
to invalidate it under O'Brien on the ground that the governmental
interest is insufficient to warrant the intrusion of First Amendment
concerns, or that there is an inadequate nexus between the regulation
and the interest sought to be served. We note that only recently, in
a case dealing with the regulations of signs, the Court framed the
issue under O'Brien and then based a crucial part of its analysis on
the time, place, and manner case.
6 '
Further, unlike lower courts that had used the O'Brien analysis,
the Clark court refused to second guess the National Park Service
as to what would be a "less intrusive manner" of regulation:
We do not believe, however, that either the United States v. O'Brien
or the time, place, and manner decisions assign to the judiciary the
authority to replace the Park Service as the manager of the Nation's
parks or endow the judiciary with the competence to judge how
much protection of park lands is wise and how that level of
conservation is to be attained.
62
60. Id. at 3071.
61. Id. at 3071-72 n.8 (citing City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118
(1984)).
62. Id.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 18
Finally, in Heffron v. International Society of Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc. ,63 members of a religious sect challenged a Minnesota
regulation that allowed solicitations at a fairground only from an
assigned booth. The stated governmental justification was the need
to maintain orderly movement of the crowd, given the large number
of exhibitors.6 The Minnesota Supreme Court invalidated the regu-
lation under the fourth prong of the O'Brien analysis, which requires
that the restriction on first amendment freedom be no greater than
is essential for the furtherance of a governmental interest. The
Minnesota Supreme Court found that the crowd control could have
been served by less intrusive means and that the religious organization
should have been granted an exemption from having to solicit from
assigned booths only.
The United States Supreme Court, in refusing to use this "as
applied" standard, found that the state supreme court took too
narrow a view of the State's interest. The Supreme Court stated that
although the campground could have granted an exemption to ISK-
CON from its rule of soliciting only from an assigned booth, this
would not justify an invalidation of the governmental interest in
maintaining orderly movement in a crowd, thereby requiring the
court to invalidate the rule. 65 The United States Supreme Court, in
relying on the time, place, and manner analysis, refused to "second
guess" the Minnesota legislature's rationale merely because the Min-
nesota Court believed the legislature could have used a less restrictive
method of regulation.
These cases demonstrate that the time, place, and manner analysis
is a less stringent standard than the O'Brien analysis. Under time,
place, and manner analysis, a court will continue to review the record
of the legislative hearing during which the city adopted an ordinance.
However, if the court determines that the purpose of the ordinance
is not to restrict first amendment freedoms, the court will not attempt
to second guess the governmental entity as to the stated governmental
interest or the remedy used to effectuate this governmental interest.
The Court also will not look at the record to determine whether less
intrusive means are available to address the evil which the ordinance
prohibits. The foregoing analysis will apply even when the ordinance
63. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
64. Heffron v. International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 651
(1981).
65. Id. at 652.
1987 / Regulating Adult Businesses
will impinge on first amendment rights. With the comparison of the
analyses in mind, we now examine the opinion of the Supreme Court
in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. .66
THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS IN
RENTON v. PLA YTIME THEATRES, INC.
In determining the validity of any zoning regulation of adult
businesses, it is important to understand what the Supreme Court
did and did not decide in Renton. Renton should not be looked
upon as giving to jurisdictions carte blanche to eliminate adult
businesses from their jurisdictions.
Renton is a city of approximately 32,000 people located south of
Seattle. The Renton City Council decided to consider the advisability
of enacting a zoning ordinance dealing with adult theaters. The stated
reason for this consideration was the blighting effect that these
theaters might have on the surrounding community. 67 At that time,
neither adult theaters nor other adult entertainment uses, such as
massage parlors or adult book stores, existed in the city.6
The experiences of Seattle and other cities with adult businesses
were reviewed by the City Planning and Development Committee at
a number of public hearings. 69 The Committee also considered the
effect of a Washington Supreme Court case, Northend Cinema, Inc.
v. City of Seattle,70 which detailed a study in Seattle that was
conducted to show on the record the "secondary effects" of adult
theaters on neighborhoods. The Committee also looked at develop-
ments in other cities as they related to the secondary effects of adult
theaters.
After the city adopted the locational zoning ordinance, Playtime
Theatres, Inc. acquired two existing theaters with the intention of
showing adult films. Playtime Theatres thereafter filed a lawsuit in
the United States District Court, challenging the ordinance as violative
of the first and fourteenth amendments. The plaintiff obtained a
preliminary injunction in the district court, but the court later vacated
that injunction. 71
66. 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
67. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 927 (1986).
68. Id. at 927.
69. Id.
70. 90 Wash. 2d 709, 585 P.2d 1153 (1978).
71. Renton, 106 S. Ct. at 927, 928.
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, using the O'Brien analysis,
reversed the district court's decision vacating the preliminary injunc-
tion. The court of appeals found:
(1) The city had improperly relied on the experience of other
cities in lieu of their own experience about the secondary effects of
adult businesses;
72
(2) The city failed to establish adequately the existence of sub-
stantial government interests in support of the ordinance based on
its own problems;"
(3) The city failed to prove that the ordinance was unrelated to
the suppression of expression; 74 and,
(4) The study of alternative locations was inadequate in that the
sites mentioned were not "presently available" for adult theaters.
7
1
The Supreme Court reversed. 76 The Supreme Court determined
that, because the ordinance in question did not ban adult theaters
altogether, it should be analyzed as a form of time, place, and
manner regulation. Accordingly, the regulation was valid unless the
plaintiff could show that the city had enacted the regulation for the
purpose of restraining speech based on its content.
The Court concluded that the ordinance was not aimed at the
content of the film shown in adult theaters, but rather at the
secondary effects of the theaters on surrounding neighborhoods.
77
The Court repudiated the O'Brien analysis, and refused to specif-
ically scrutinize the record to determine if any "motivating factor"
behind the enactment of the ordinance evidenced an intent to
restrict Playtime Theatres' exercise of first amendment rights. In
rejecting the "motivating factor" analysis originally set forth in
Tovar v. Billneyer," the Court strongly relied on language in
O'Brien79 in which the court declared that it "will not strike down
an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit
legislative motive . . .
The Supreme Court's acceptance of the time, place, and manner
analysis set forth by Justice Stevens in Young also signalled the
72. Id. at 928.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 932.
76. Id. at 933.
77. Id. at 929.
78. 721 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1983).
79. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
80. Renton, 106 S. Ct. at 929 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84
(1968)).
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Court's view that the type of expression at issue did not deserve the
fullest protection. The Court deemed it "manifest that society's
interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different
and lesser magnitude than the interest and untrammled political
debate."18' Interestingly, Justice Powell joined without comment the
majority of the Court in repudiating the use of the O'Brien four-
prong analysis of the ordinance.Y2
Having accepted this analysis, the court faced the only two issues
remaining: (1) the existence of a substantial governmental interest
allowing the regulation, and (2) the availability of reasonable alter-
native avenues of communication. 3 As to the substantial governmen-
tal interest, the court permitted the city to rely on the experience
and studies of other cities to demonstrate that adult businesses can
have deleterious effects on the community. 4 The regulation and/or
the elimination of these secondary effects constituted a governmental
interest.
The Supreme Court did not require that, before enacting an
ordinance, a city must conduct new studies to produce evidence of
the secondary effects of adult theaters independent of evidence al-
ready generated by other cities. As long as the city relied on evidence
which it reasonably believed was relevant to the problem, the city
could base an ordinance on that evidence. 5 For example, if a city is
concerned with the blighting of a residential neighborhood by an
adult business located in the area, the study from another jurisdiction
must show the casual connection between adult theaters in a residen-
tial neighborhood and consequent blight. The Supreme Court did
not require that the city wait until a theater opens up within its
jurisdiction before determining whether adult theaters can cause the
"secondary effects." ' 86 Also, the Court did not require the city to
study the effects that an adult business, in existence at the time the
ordinance was to be adopted, had on the community. 7
The Supreme Court further addressed the relationship between the
evidence relied on by a municipality and the means of regulation
chosen by that municipality. Even though a city used a study of
81. Id. at 929-30 n.2 (citing American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 70 (plurality opinion)).
82. Id. at 926. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 930, 931.
86. Id. at 931.
87. Id.
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another jurisdiction to determine that adult theaters can cause "sec-
ondary effects," the Court did not require the city to use the same
remedy used by the other jurisdiction to combat the "secondary
effects." 8  If the city conducting the study had used a disbursement
ordinance, 9 the city relying on that study could enact a disbursement
ordinance, a concentration ordinance,90 or other remedy to combat
the secondary effects of adult businesses. The court stressed that
"the city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment
with solutions." 9
The Supreme Court was not convinced by the argument of Playtime
Theatres that the Renton ordinance was underinclusive, and therefore
discriminatory, in that the ordinance failed to regulate other adult
businesses likely to produce secondary effects similar to those pro-
duced by adult theaters. The Court reasoned that even though there
was no evidence of other adult businesses on the record at the
legislative hearing, the City of Renton might amend its ordinance to
include some other type of adult business that had been shown to
cause the same kind of secondary effects.
9 2
In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, vigorously
disputed this point. They argued that the ordinance did discriminate
on its face against certain forms of speech based on content. The
two justices were concerned that the ordinance singled out motion
pictures and did not regulate other forms of adult entertainment,
such as bars or massage parlors, regardless of whether the businesses
were in existence or not. 93 The dissent apparently would take the
approach that if a city's concern is the effect of adult businesses on
neighborhoods, then all adult businesses should be included in the
ordinance to avoid a challenge of discrimination through "underin-
clusiveness."
9 4
88. Id. at 931.
89. Id. at 931 (citing American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 71).
90. A dispersement ordinance disperses the adult uses throughout the city by means of
limiting the location of one adult business in proximity to another adult business, such as
allowing no adult business to be within 500 feet of another adult business. This is the type of
ordinance in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 926 (1986). A concentration
ordinance exists when all adult businesses are concentrated either in a particular zone (such as
a commercial zone), or within a specific zone on a particular street or streets. Such an
ordinance is in effect in the City of Boston, Massachusetts, which contains a "combat zone"
where all adult businesses are located.
91. Renton, 106 S. Ct. 925, 931 (1986).
92. Id. at 932.
93. Id. at 934.
94. Id.
1987 / Regulating Adult Businesses
Finally, the majority turned its attention to the question of whether
the ordinance allowed for "reasonable alternative avenues of com-
munication." 95 They noted that the ordinance left 520 acres, or more
than 5%, of the entire City of Renton to adult theaters. 96 In response,
Playtime Theatres argued that some of the land in question was
already occupied by existing businesses and was not truly available.
However, the Supreme Court disagreed:
That respondents must fend for themselves in the real estate market,
on an equal footing with other prospective purchasers and lessees,
does not give rise to a First Amendment violation. And although
we have cautioned against the enactment of zoning regulations that
have "the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting accesss to
lawful speech," American Mini Theatres, we have never suggested
that the First Amendment compels the Government to ensure that
adult theaters, or any other kinds of speech-related businesses for
that matter, will be able to obtain sites at bargain prices ... ("The
inquiry for First Amendment purposes is not concerned with eco-
nomic impact.") In our view, the First Amendment requires only
that Renton refrain from effectively denying a respondent a reason-
able opportunity to open and operate an adult theater within the
city.
97
If the evidence in the record reveals that there is no place within
the jurisdiction where the adult business could open, then the ordi-
nance would be subject to being stricken.98 If the state does allow
an amortization period, the jurisdiction must also be concerned about
whether reasonable alternative sites for relocation are available. 99
IMPLICATIONS OF RENTON RELATED TO THE
REGULATION OF ADULT BUSINESSES
Renton has left a number of unanswered questions which must be
evaluated:
I. Would the result in Renton have been different if the stated
governmental interest was the prevention of blight in a commercial
zone where bars, pool halls, and so on were present in the area in
95. Id. at 932.
96. Id.
97. Id. (citations omitted).
98. Id. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Ebel v. City of
Corona, 767 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1985).
99. Ebel, 767 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1985). In Ebel the court of appeal struck down an adult
business ordinance because Ebel had put evidence on the record that there was no other site
at which it could relocate. Id. at 639.
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addition to adult theaters, but the city chooses to regulate only the
location of adult theaters?'0
2. What effect will the Renton decision have on those circum-
stances where all adult businesses are relegated to a heavy industrial
zone? ' 0 The issue here is whether this relegation leaves open rea-
sonable alternative avenues of communication. One might argue,
citing Renton, that since the owners are not effectively denied a
reasonable opportunity to open and operate somewhere in the city,
the regulation is not invalid. The argument would be that, under
Renton, adult theaters are not entitled to operate in a commercial
zone.
3. How would an ordinance adopted after Renton affect busi-
nesses that are already established when the ordinance is adopted?
To regulate existing businesses, a city would need a legal determi-
nation that the state permits the amortization of nonconforming
uses.'0 2 Further, the city would have to produce evidence in the
record that there were reasonable alternative sites where existing
businesses could locate were available. 03 Lastly, the amortization
period as applied must be reasonable.104 When analyzing an amor-
tization period, the courts have used a balancing test to determine
whether the harm to the user outweighs the benefits to the public
gained from termination of the use from its present location.'0 5
Prior to Renton, the federal courts used the third prong of the
O'Brien analysis, which requires that the ordinance cannot be enacted
100. See Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982).
101. See id. at 1214. In Basiardanes, all adult theaters, via locational zoning ordinances,
were relegated to areas around warehouses, shipyards, undeveloped areas, and swamps. The
locations were poorly lit, barren of structures suitable for showing films, and probably unsafe.
In theory, the locations were available to adult movie proprietors and patrons, but they were
completely unsuited to such a use.
102. When a city adopts a zoning ordinance which will affect a business in existence by
requiring that business to move after a period of time, or under certain conditions (such as
destruction of 50% of the business), it becomes known as a "nonconforming use," which
means that it is not conforming with the zoning ordinance in effect. A number of states have
failed to adopt or have repudiated amortization periods. These states-Ohio, Missouri, Ar-
kansas-view the amortization of a nonconforming use as no different than a taking of a
vested right. See generally People Tags, Inc. v. Jackson County Legislature, No. 85-0028-CU-
W-9 (W.D. Mo. June 3, 1986) (applying Missouri law). California does have an amortization
period. See Caster v. City of Oakland, 129 Cal. App. 3d 98, 180 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1982); Los
Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
103. Caster v. City of Oakland, 129 Cal. App. 3d 95, 180 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1982); Ebel v.
City of Corona, 767 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1985).
104. Ebel, 767 F.2d at 639.
105. See Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 709, 585 P.2d 1153 (1978).
See also Ebel v. City of Corona, 767 F.2d 635, 639 (1985). The Ebel court found that Ebel
had the burden of proof that the amortization period was unreasonable. The Ebel court
applied the balancing test set forth in Northend and held that the district court did not err in
holding that the 60-day amortization period was unreasonable in light of the length of the
Ebel lease and the financing investment Ebel had in her book store.
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with intent to suppress first amendment protected speech, to disap-
prove ordinances that did not contain a grandfather clause for existing
businesses.'06 The governmental agency had a heavy burden of dis-
proving an intent to suppress speech, especially where there was no
evidence that the particular theater or business in fact would cause
the evil at which the ordinance was aimed. 0 7 For example, in Avalon
Cinema Corp. v. Thompson,10 the Eighth Circuit struck down a
North Little Rock, Arkansas ordinance regulating adult entertainment
on the grounds that the ordinance required the one theater in town
to move because it was located within 100 yards of a residential
neighborhood. The court questioned the substantial governmental
interest and the city's motives because the city's stated interest was
the evil caused by a concentration of adult businesses. Only one
theater was operating in town, and the ordinance required that theater
to move. After Renton, the courts will have to decide whether one
theater can constitute a "concentration."
In answering these questions, cities should not take the Renton
decision and analysis as giving them carte blanche to eliminate adult
businesses from within a community. The jurisdiction cannot simply
adopt an ordinance from another jurisdiction as its own without
running the risk that a court will find that the regulation is merely
an attempt to restrict first amendment rights. The jurisdiction wishing
to regulate the adult business through zoning must have adequate
evidence on the record to support its findings as to the evil caused
by adult businesses within a community, as well as the remedy chosen
to combat these evils. The following guidelines, gleaned from Renton,
are important to consider when using zoning as a tool to regulate
adult businesses:
1. The sale of books, newspapers, films, and video cassettes,
and the operation of movie theaters showing adult materials are
protected by the first amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.' °9 Because of these first amendment implications, any regula-
tion of adult businesses must be supported by an adequate record
of the legislative meeting, and a city must adopt findings supported
by evidence on the record. The regulation cannot be viewed as a
normal legislative act if there is no preparation of an adequate
106. Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 667 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1981).
107. Id. at 661.
108. 667 F.2d 659, 661 (8th Cir. 1981).
109. See Cinema Arts, Inc. v. County of Clark, 722 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1983).
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record of a legislative meeting or of findings based on the evidence
in the record of that meeting.""
2. The courts will analyze any ordinance regulating adult busi-
nesses through zoning as a form of time, place, and manner
regulation.'" The record of the legislative hearing must contain
evidence that:
(A) At the time the city adopted the ordinance, the purpose of
the ordinance was content-neutral;
(B) The ordinance was aimed at the secondary effects of the
adult businesses on the surrounding community, and not at the
content of adult films; and
(C) The regulation serves a substantial governmental interest and
does not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. "2
3. If the stated substantial governmental interest in regulating
the locations of adult businesses is preserving the quality of urban
life by avoiding the secondary effects caused by adult businesses,
the city must have evidence on the legislative record that adult
businesses cause these effects. However, the city does not have to
prove that, at the time of the adoption of the ordinance, the adult
businesses present in the city cause these effects. The city may
instead rely on the experience and studies of other cities that have
dealt with adult businesses."' When relying on these studies, the
city must have evidence on the record that the legislative body
reasonably believes that the findings of the studies are relevant to
the concerns of their jurisdiction. For example, if a city is concerned
with urban blight that might be caused by adult theaters, the city
must have evidence on the record that the studies which they relied
on show the casual connection between adult theaters and urban
blight. 1
4
4. If the evidence on the record of the legislative hearing reveals
that the "predominant" intent of the city was to use zoning to
eliminate the secondary effects of adult businesses, a reviewing court
will not invalidate the ordinance on the basis of an alleged illicit
legislative intent or motive." ' In other words, even if citizens testify
at the public hearing against the adult business on the basis of its
content, that testimony alone will not cause the ordinance to fail.
5. Even if a city uses a study from another city to prove
deleterious secondary effects caused by adult businesses, the city is
110. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 u.S 61 (1981).
111. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 928 (1986).
112. Id. at 930.
113. Id. at 931.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 929.
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not required to use the same remedy as the other city to regulate
those secondary effects."
6
6. Adequate evidence must appear on the record of the legislative
hearing that demonstrate alternative avenues of communication for
adult businesses are available. This requirement does not mean the
city has the burden of showing that the adult business will be able
to obtain a site at a bargain price; the study of alternative sites
need merely demonstrate that the business has a reasonable oppor-
tunity to open and operate within the community. The inquiry for
first amendment purposes does not concern economic impact."
7
Additionally, there is no requirement that the agency conducting
the study of alternative locations contact specific real estate agents,
developers, and so on to determine if the business can actually
"open up" in that particular location. Alternative sites must be
shown to exist within the jurisdiction, but the jurisdiction need not
prove that the sites are economically viable." 8
CONCLUSION
For any legislative body intending to regulate adult businesses
through zoning, this article should give some guidance about the
review a court will follow in reviewing a locational zoning ordinance
of an adult business. The 1986 United States Supreme Court decision
in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. should not be viewed as giving
legislative bodies carte blanche in the regulation of adult businesses
through zoning. Even with the presumption of validity under the
time, place, and manner analysis, because first amendment rights are
involved, it is still imperative that an adequate record with findings
be established. The findings must be based on evidence that supports
the governmental reasons for regulating the businesses in question.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 932.
118. Id.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 18
